LFCS Seminar: Elias Koutsoupias
Nearoptimal multiunit auctions with ordered bidders
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When 
May 21, 2013 from 04:00 PM to 05:00 PM 
Where  IF 4.3133 
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I will discuss online profitmaximizing auctions for digital goods. In particular, I will give an overview of the area and I will focus on priorfree auctions with ordered bidders and identical items. In this model, we compare the expected revenue of an auction to the monotone price benchmark: the maximum revenue that can be obtained from a bid vector using prices that are nonincreasing in the bidder ordering and bounded above by the secondhighest bid. I will discuss an auction with constantfactor approximation guarantee for identical items, in both unlimited and limited supply settings. Consequently, this auction is simultaneously nearoptimal for essentially every Bayesian environment in which bidders' valuation distributions have nonincreasing monopoly prices, or in which the distribution of each bidder stochastically dominates that of the next.