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LFCS Seminar: Elias Koutsoupias

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Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders

What
  • LFCS Seminar
When May 21, 2013
from 04:00 PM to 05:00 PM
Where IF 4.31-33
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I will discuss online profit-maximizing auctions for digital goods. In particular, I will give an overview of the area and I will focus on prior-free auctions with ordered bidders and identical items.  In this model, we compare the expected revenue of an auction to the monotone price benchmark: the maximum revenue that can be obtained from a bid vector using prices that are nonincreasing in the bidder ordering and bounded above by the second-highest bid. I will discuss an auction with constant-factor approximation guarantee for identical items, in both unlimited and limited supply settings.  Consequently, this auction is simultaneously near-optimal for essentially every Bayesian environment in which bidders' valuation distributions have nonincreasing monopoly prices, or in which the distribution of each bidder stochastically dominates that of the next.

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